




The Dissertation Committee for Devrim Ikizler
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
Essays on Monetary Economics and Central Banking
Committee:
P. Dean Corbae, Supervisor








Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
August 2011
Dedicated to my parents Derya Ibrahimagaoglu and Omer Lutfi Ikizler.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my supervisors P. Dean Corbae and Maxwell B.
Stinchcombe for their time and encouragement. They have both done a lot to
teach me the cores of economic research and their guidance helped me in all
the time of writing of this thesis. Besides my supervisors, I am also grateful
to my committee members, especially to Burhanettin Kuruscu and Thomas
Wiseman for their helpful comments.
I would also like to thank Timur Hulagu and Temel Taskin for their
helpful recommendations, suggestions and friendship.Last but not least, I
would like to thank Martin Dumav, Gonul Sengul and Takashi Hayashi for
their valuable comments about different papers in my thesis.
v
Essays on Monetary Economics and Central Banking
Publication No.
Devrim Ikizler, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2011
Supervisors: P. Dean Corbae
Maxwell B. Stinchcombe
In the first chapter, I analyze the US banking industry in order to
explain two facts. First, larger banks have lower but less volatile returns on
loans compared to smaller banks over the years. Second, larger borrowers have
better financial records, i.e. verifiable “hard” information, and they are more
likely to match with larger banks, as documented by Berger et al.(2005). I
show that these two facts can be explained using a segmented loan markets
model with loan contracts between banks and borrowers. Moreover, I show
that the difference between the banks returns is not due to diversification
advantage of larger banks. Instead, it is because of the fact that larger banks
can operate in both large and small loan markets, whereas small banks can
only operate in small loans market. Therefore large banks are able to match
with larger and less risky borrowers more frequently, which are less likely to
default. Moreover, I take the model to infinite horizon allowing bank size to
be endogenous to answer multiple policy questions about the future of small
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business finance and consolidation. I use the data set from the Consolidated
Reports of Condition and Income provided by FDIC for 1984-2010 to motivate
our research question and to estimate the model.
My second chapter revisits the welfare cost of anticipated inflation in an
incomplete markets environment where agents can substitute time for money
by increasing their shopping frequency. Shopping activity provides an insur-
ance channel to individuals against changes in the return on nominal balances
through inflation as documented by Aguiar and Hurst (2007) and McKenzie
and Schargrodsky (2011). In my model economy, a higher level of inflation
affects people through two channels. First, it distorts the portfolio decision
between real and nominal balances, second it redistributes wealth from those
who hold more money to those who hold less. People, on average, respond
to a higher level of inflation by increasing their price search activity, as they
relative return on nominal balances goes down. I find that a 5% increase in
inflation causes the welfare level go down by 2% if people are allowed to sub-
stitute time for money, and by 10% if we take this channel away from the
model.
Finally, in the third chapter, I compare the indirect measure of inflation
expectations derived by Ireland (1996b) to the direct measures obtained from
expectations surveys in multiple countries. Our results show that the inflation
bounds calculated for US and UK data are more volatile than survey results,
and are too narrow to contain them due to low standard errors in consump-
tion growth series stemming from high persistence. For Chilean and Turkish
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cases, however, computed bound for inflation expectations seems to fit the
survey results better. Out of three different surveys on inflation expectations
in Turkey compared with the bounds computed using Turkish data, expec-
tations obtained by the Consumer Tendency Survey fall within these bounds
throughout the whole sample period. The success in the Turkish and Chilean
cases can be attributed to the fact that volatility in the consumption series,
whereas the failure in US and UK cases are most probably stemming from the
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Chapter 1
US Banking Industry Dynamics: A Matching
Model with Segmented Loan Markets
1.1 Introduction
This papers explores the following questions: Why do larger banks
have lower and less volatile return on loans compared to smaller banks? What
are the bank and borrower characteristics that determine the match between
banks and borrowers, and the interest rates on loan contracts? In order to un-
derstand these phenomena, my paper is motivated to use the following facts
from the empirical finance literature. First, larger borrowers have better fi-
nancial records, i.e. verifiable “hard” information, and are more likely to work
with larger banks, as documented by Berger et al. (2005) using the National
Survey of Small Business Finance. Their results show that if the size of the
firm and the size of the loan both double, the size of the bank that provides
the loan increase by about 40%. Second, Jimenez and Saurina (2004), using
information on more than three million loans entries (1988-2000) collected by
the Bank of Spain, shows that larger sized loans have lower probability of
default, controlling for the collateral. Moreover, Degryse and Ongena (2005),
using 15,000 loan entries comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian
bank, documents that larger loans get charged lower interest rates compared to
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smaller loans. Together, I show that these facts can explain the observed aver-
age return-volatility difference between large vs. small banks using a matching
model with loan contracts.
Uncovering the channels behind these two facts is very important for
two reasons. First of all, these facts are closely related to numerous policy is-
sues. Small business finance is a very big concern due to consolidation trends in
the industry. US banking industry has been going through a dramatic restruc-
turing over the last 30 years. Bank exits during the savings and loans crisis
during 80s, and interstate branching and merger waves caused by the banking
regulations during 90s are the two big reasons why US banking industry ex-
perienced an enormous consolidation over the last few decades1. Second, how
the bank size distribution affects systematic risk is a very hot research topic
especially after the financial crisis. Our model can be used to conduct policy
experiments to answer these questions.
The fact that we use the stable matchings with contracts as our notion
of static loan market equilibrium is a unique aspect of our analysis. The quote
by Crawford (1991) explains the reason very effectively: “Perhaps the most
important advantage of the matching approach is its robustness to heterogene-
ity. A traditional competitive equilibrium cannot exist in general unless the
goods traded in each market are homogeneous, because all goods in the same
market must sell at the same price. A traditional model of labor markets with
1See Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) and Jones and Critchfield (2005) for a detailed
analysis of the transformation of US banking industry
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the degree of heterogeneity normally encountered therefore has the structure
of a multi-market general equilibrium model. The theory of matching markets
replaces this collection of markets with a single market game, in which the
terms of partnerships are determined endogenously, along with the matching,
via negotiations between prospective partners. The notion of stability, suitably
generalized, formalizes the idea of competition, and thereby makes it possible
to evaluate the robustness of traditional competitive analysis to heterogeneity.”
A matching approach is a lot more suitable for our model of segmented loan
markets. Since each loan size has it’s own supply and demand by different
groups of banks.
Our paper builds on the paper by Corbae and Derasmo (2011), which
uses a very rich model of banking to explain how the US banking industry
structure interacts with the business cycles. The focus of this study is instead
on the difference in loan returns between large and small banks. To under-
stand this fact, we analyze the effect of bank size on how banks and borrowers
match in the loan market. The study by Emmons et al (2004) finds evi-
dence that expanding in asset size in a single location provides better default
risk-reduction than expanding to different locations for community banks. A
diversification argument in favor of large banks cannot explain these findings
altogether. Our mechanism explores this channel as follows: large banks more
frequently match with larger borrowers because of their size advantage, and
larger borrowers are more likely to be verified borrowers who have lower prob-
ability of default; therefore large banks have lower and less volatile returns.
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Our paper is also closely related to work by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) which
provides a general theory of two sided matching with contracts. I use their
equilibrium concept and extend their model to an infinite number of agents
(with still finite types and therefore finite types of contracts) on one side of
the market and apply it to the US banking industry.
Contribution of our paper to the existing literature is twofold: First,
we consider heterogeneity among banks as well as borrowers to explain the dif-
ferences among small and large banks. Moreover to our knowledge we are the
first paper letting borrowers to send a signal to banks in terms of their project
productivity(i.e. getting their financial documents audited), but among those
who can’t afford to send signal, we still observe credit rationing in equilibrium
as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
Literature in finance on bank size and relationship banking is very large.
Understanding banks’ side of the story, Stein (2002) shows theoretically how
large organizations face inefficiencies in processing soft, unverifiable informa-
tion (i.e. difficulty in transferring soft information). Applying this mechanism
to banking industry, Berger et al. (2005) empirically analyzes the existence of
this theory in US banking data. They document large banks have compara-
tive advantages in lending technologies such as credit scoring that are based on
”hard” quantitative data. Small banks, in contrast, may have comparative ad-
vantages in lending technologies such as relationship lending that are based on
”soft” information that is difficult to quantify and transmit through the com-
munication channels of large banking organizations. In particular, large banks
4
are less willing to lend to informationally difficult credits, such as firms with no
financial records. Moreover, after controlling for the endogeneity of bank-firm
matching, they find that large banks interact more impersonally with their
borrowers, have shorter and less exclusive relationships, and do not alleviate
credit constraints as effectively. Moreover, controlling for firm size, firms that
have financial records borrow from banks that are roughly 24% larger. This is
consistent with the idea that, all else equal, larger banks are at a comparative
advantage in lending to firms for which hard information is more readily avail-
able. Consistent with these arguments, Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995)
show that large banks relative to small banks in the U.S. have been found
to lend proportionately less of their assets to Small and Medium Enterprises
(from now on SMEs), to lend to larger, older, more financially secure SMEs
when they do so (e.g., Haynes, Ou, and Berey (1999)), to charge lower rates,
earn lower yields, and require collateral less often on their SME loans (e.g.,
Berger and Udell, (1996), Carter, McNulty, and Verbrugge, (2004)). DeYoung,
Hunter, and Udell (2004) shows that relative to large banks, small banks tend
to serve smaller and local customers.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Next we will look at the
empirical facts in detail, then introduce our model and discuss our equilibrium
further, present the results and conclude.
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1.2 Data and Motivation
We use data from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income
provided by FDIC for 1984-2010. Data is publicly available through Federal
bank of Chicago. Our data set is quarterly available for most variables and
yearly available for some. Table 1 shows some statistics concerning our main
motivation for this study. For each quarter, we ranked banks according to
total assets, and calculated average return on loans for each group of banks
and, finally calculated the averages and standard deviation over the sample
period2.
Table 1.1: All loans, 1984-2010
Group of banks Avg Returns St Deviation
Top 100 5.07 1.08
All but top 100 6.2 1.34
According to data, those banks that are larger in size, have on average
lower but less volatile returns on loans. In the table below, we repeat the same
exercise focusing on the commercial and industrial(C&I)loans only3. This is
indeed the statistic that is more accurate for our study. Commercial and
industrial loans are those that are given out to businesses and enterprises, as
opposed to real estate or agricultural loans. Each category requires a different
approach since the risks and borrower characteristics associated with each type
2For total assets we use rcfd2170, for income from loans we use riad4010 and riad4059
and for total loans we used rcfd2122. Calculating the return on loans we divided total
income from loans by total loans.
3We use the variable riad4012 for the returns, and rcon1766 for the total C&I loans.
Note that rcon1766 is reported on FFIEC041 form unlike other variables
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of loan is going to be different. Our focus is going to be on the differences
on C&I loans because these are the loans where bank size really matters in
terms of how they match with different types of borrowers. Figure 1 depicts the
differences in charge off rates4 for all loans and for C&I loans. To be more clear,
each point on the graph refers to the percentage of loans not received by small
banks minus percentage of loans not received by large banks. Throughout the
whole sample period, the charge off rate difference for C&I loans is always
above the charge off rate difference for all loans (except for one quarter for
which the economy is in serious recession). This means that small banks more
often match with riskier borrowers when they give out C&I loans, therefore a
smaller portion of them are likely to pay back. For this reason, we will focus
on C&I loans.
Table 1.2: Commercial and Industrial(C&I)Loans, 2001-2010
Group of banks Avg Return St Deviation
Top 100 3.79 0.7
Top 1000 4.31 0.81
Bottom 1000 4.85 0.88
As you can see in Figure 2, the difference in bank returns between large
and small banks is not only a statistic true on average but hold at every point
in our sample period. 5
Figure 3 shows the data from individual banks. We look at the banks
that were in business through the sample period (excluding new entrants and
4Ratio of loan payments not received at least 60 days after the due date.
5This is true even when we look at all loans for different groups of banks and time periods.
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those that exit at some point). There are 6931 banks that continuously oper-
ated for 38 quarters in 2001-2010 and for each individual banks, we calculated
the mean and standard deviation of returns on C&I loans over the sample
period. This figure shows the tradeoff between returns and risk.
1.3 Static Model
We start with introducing the model. There are finite number of banks,
each of which identified by their sizes di ∈ D = {d1, d2...dN}, and there are
infinitely many borrowers, characterized by their project size and productivity
parameters (`, z) ∈ L × Z. We assume that both the project size and the
productivity have finite supports Z = {z1, z2...zMz} and L = {`1, `2...`M`} .
We also assume that project size is observable to everyone but productivity
is private information and only observed by the borrower herself. Timing of
events in our model is as follows:
i. Borrowers draw their project size(observable) and productivity(unobservable)
(z, `) with according to cdf G(z, `),( and pdf g(z, `)))
ii. Borrowers choose if they want to get audited (θ = 1) or not(θ = 0), if
audited they can reveal(and verify) their productivity to others
iii. Applications submitted, banks choose how many contracts they want
to offer to each type of borrower, borrowers choose the contract with
lowest interest rate, and matching process continues until a stable set of
contracts is reached
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iv. Both sides match, borrowers who received a loan choose the level of risk
and projects undertaken and profits realize.
A bank and a borrower are matched through a loan contract, which
specifies the project size, the borrower productivity (if the borrower is audited)
and the interest rate on the loan. Note that only the interest rate is going
to be an endogenous term of the contract. As banks have different deposit
capacities, each bank might give out different number of loans in equilibrium.
Our solution technique for the equilibrium matching problem between the
borrowers and the banks is stability, and it is similar in essence to Hatfield
and Milgrom (2005). We solve for the a set of contracts6 from which there are
no incentives for any agent to deviate by forming other matches, and use that
as our equilibrium concept. First, we will define the set of contracts, banks’
and the borrowers’ problem, and then return to equilibrium in greater detail.
1.3.1 Contracts
Let banks and borrowers indexed by i and j, respectively. Let set of
interest rates that can be specified in a contract be the set of real numbers.
The set of contracts is defined as:
X = {(i, j, r)|i ∈ D, j ∈ Z ∪ {u} × L, r ∈ R} (1.3.1)
Each contract x ∈ X specifies a bank by i, a borrower by j and an
interest rate r ∈ R on the loan. Note that we assume that there are finite
6We will later discuss in detail why we think this is the right choice.
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number of banks(N) and finite types of borrowers(however infinite number of
borrowers). Here, it is important to be careful about what is on the contract
and what is not. Project size is part of the contract as it is observable by
everyone. However, project productivity can only be revealed if the borrower
pays the verification cost of being audited as we will describe below. Therefore
j can either specify a productivity level z ∈ Z or denote a u that stands for
unaudited. Both banks and borrowers will choose their optimal contracts from
the available set of contracts in each round of our matching algorithm, and we
will find the equilibrium subset of contracts. That’s why the set of contracts
is the most important aspect of our analysis.
1.3.2 Banks
The problem of a bank is to choose how many contracts to offer to which
type of borrowers so as to maximize the expected profits given the capacity
constraint. Our bank profit function is very similar to the one by Boyd and
De Nicolo (2005). The only difference is the fact that our bank is capable of
given out multiple loan contracts to different borrowers since each bank have
different amount of deposits available. Banks enter the period knowing the
current state of the banking industry. Static profit function of a bank with
deposit level d is:
10









s.t. 0 ≤ ηij ≤ g(zj, `j), ∀j
(1.3.2)
where ηij is the number of type j borrowers bank i would like to sign
a contract with, Rj is the level of risk the borrower j is going to choose after
the contract is signed, d is the deposit capacity for bank i, and µ is the state
of the banking industry, which defines how many banks are currently there at
each deposit capacity level d. Moreover, θ = 0 means that the borrower chose
not to be audited so that θizi = 0 as well, and that’s why the contract for that
borrower do not depend on his productivity. However, θ = 1 and θizi = 1 sim-
ply imply that the borrower got audited and revealed his productivity type
so that contract terms will be determined accordingly. Profits of the bank
are summed over the individual loan contracts, i.e. {∀j | ηij 6= 0}, she signs
in equilibrium. Therefore the optimization problem of our banks is choos-
ing the most profitable set of contracts among the available ones. Through
this optimization problem we obtain an induced preference ordering over the
sets of contracts available to each bank. We will be more specific about the
preferences over the sets of borrowers and how this procedure relates to our
equilibrium below. The function p(Rj, θjzj) is the probability of success of the
contract with borrower type j. More specifically, we assume that the proba-
bility of success depends on the type of the borrower (if audited), i.e. z,and
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the level of risk the borrower will choose. Note that the level of risk chosen by
the borrower will also depend on the interest rate on the loan contract as we
will see in the borrowers problem.
Note that the first constraint implies a segmented markets structure
since we are only allowing banks to work with borrowers up to their sizes.
One obvious consequence of this market structure is the fact that larger banks
will have the advantage of choosing from a larger pool of borrowers, therefore
in equilibrium they will end up working with more productive borrowers.
1.3.3 Borrowers
There is an infinite number of borrowers in our model economy and Γ is
the distribution of borrowers over the possible productivity and project sizes,
the set Z×L. Therefore, Γ tells us how many borrowers there are at each state.
We assume that the project productivity of a borrower is unobservable unless
the borrower gets audited. We see each borrower as a firm or entrepreneur
looking for funding for their investment projects.
All the borrowers live only for one period. Therefore we assume limited
liability on the borrower side. In case of failure on the project undertaken,
the borrower defaults.7 Another implication of the one period lived borrower
assumption is that there is multiple period relationship banking in our model.
Every period newly born borrowers with no history apply for loans.
7Note that it is either failure or success on the project, there is no partial success in our
model.
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Our borrowers make three decisions: First, each borrower decide whether
they want to be audited or not prior to loan applications, then once the ap-
plications are submitted, borrowers look for the bank that offers the lowest
interest rate loan contract (since each borrower will accept only one loan con-
tract). Once banks and borrowers match and the equilibrium set of contracts
are reached, then borrowers with a loan contract get to choose the risk level
they want to undertake.
First we will describe the auditing decision:
UA(z, `;µ, σ) = max{Γ(`, µ, σ)p(R∗(r`(µ, σ)), z)[R∗(r`(µ, σ))− r`(µ, σ)]`,
− c(θ, `) + Γ(z, `, µ, σ)p(R∗(r`(z, µ, σ)), z)[R∗(r`(z, µ, σ))− r`(z, µ, σ)]`, 0}
(1.3.3)
Here, µ is the state of the banking industry, σ is the strategy vector for
all borrowers, and R∗ is the optimal choice of risk by the borrower once the
loan contract is signed as a function of the interest rate. Γ(z, `, µ, σ) denotes
the probability of getting a loan. Obviously, being able to get a loan depends,
on the loan supply, i.e. µ8.In this stage, each borrower chooses to get audited
or not, comparing the expected interest rate gain of being audited to the cost




= Γ(z, `, µ, σ)p(R∗, z∗` )[R
∗−r`(z∗` , µ, σ)]−Γ(`, µ, σ)p(R∗, z∗` )[R∗−r`(µ, σ)]
(1.3.4)
8In the simply case where loan supply is equal to loan demand, Γ(z, `, µ, σ) = 1, ∀z, l
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where z∗` is the cutoff for choosing θ = 1, i.e. for getting audited, that solves
the equation above for project size `. Left hand side is the cost of getting
audited per unit of loans and the right hand side describes the benefit from
getting audited per unit of loan. We assume that the cost function satisfies:
∂c(θ, `)
∂`
≥ 0, c(θ, ` = 0) > 0 (1.3.5)
Therefore, the cost of auditing is increasing in borrowers size and has a fixed
component. This is consistent with the data, as presented in O’Keefe et
al.(1994). This assumption has implications for the cutoff level of produc-
tivity and how it is affected by the loan size.
Only those borrowers that are more productive than z∗` will find it prof-
itable to get audited and reveal their project productivity to banks. Once the
auditing decisions are made, next step is finding a stable matching between
banks and borrowers. All borrowers will look for the lowest interest rate avail-
able among the set of contracts offered. However, there is still an important
aspect about the borrower choice that needs to be clarified. If there are more
than one bank offering the same interest rate to a borrower, which one is she
going to choose? Here, we solve the model using the following tie-breaking
rule: for any two banks with sizes d1 and d2that are offering the same interest
rate, the borrower will choose bank 1 with probability d1
d1+d2
, i.e. probability
being proportional to the size of the bank9.
9We can rationalize this assumption by assuming that number of branches a bank has is
proportional to its size and those branches are evenly distributed over where borrowers are
located, and borrowers choose the bank that is the closest to them.
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Now we turn to the last step of the borrower’s problem. Below we
state the investment problem for borrowers, i.e. choice of riskiness R. Once
the borrower signs a loan contract with r`,:
U b(z, `, r`) = max
R
{p(R, z)(R− r`)}` (1.3.6)
Therefore, depending on how high the interest rate on the loan contract,







(R∗ − r`) + p(R∗, z)}` = 0 (1.3.7)
where R∗ = R(r`, z) is the optimum level of risk chosen by the borrower.
Note here that the level of risk chosen is increasing in the interest rate on the












This property of the borrowers’ problem will induce an optimum loan
interest rate for the bank. An interest rate that is too high will cause the
borrower to take too much risk, therefore reducing the expected profit for the
bank, and any lower interest rate will reduce the risk along with the return.
So, banks profit function will be hump shaped10.
1.3.4 Static Loan Market Equilibrium
We now turn to definition of our static market equilibrium. Since we
will use the notion of stability as our equilibrium concept, we need to precisely
define stability. First we need to introduce some notation:
Definition 1. i. A matching between banks and borrowers is stable if it is
not blocked by any individual bank, borrower or bank-borrower pair.
ii. A group stable matching is one that is not blocked by any coalition of
banks and borrowers.
Now we state the concept of stability in terms of our value functions
taking advantage of the preference assumptions in our model.
Definition 2. i. Let Vij(r) = {p(Rj, θjzj)(r`ij − rd(µ))}`j be the value of a
contract with borrower type j for bank i at the interest rate r.
10This property has been introduced by Stiglitz and Weiss (81), and used by Corbae and
Derasmo (2010) in their problem for borrowers as well
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ii. Let U bj (r
`) = {p(R∗, zj)(R∗ − r`j)}`j be the value of a loan contract at
the interest rate r with borrower j11.
Definition 3. An equilibrium in this market consists of a vector of cutoff
values {z∗` }`∈L, a vector of interest rates {r`ij}I×J , a vector of banks portfolio
choices {ηij}I×J s.t. a subset of contracts X
′ ⊂ X is a stable allocation if:
i. Banks and borrowers problems, i.e. (2), (3) and (6) are satisfied.
ii. ∀` ∈ L, z∗` satisfies (4).





)} ≥ 0, ∀(i, j, r′) ∈ X ′ (1.3.9)





)} ≥ Vi0j0(r0) or Uj0(r
′
) ≤ Uj0(r0),∀(i0, j0, r0) ∈ X \X
′
(1.3.10)
Condition (1) implies that given the interest rates, banks portfolio
choices solve the bank’s profit maximization problem, and borrowers makes
their risk/return choices optimally. Condition (2) asserts that the productiv-
ity cutoff rule for being audited is satisfied. Therefore, none of the borrowers
will have incentive to change their auditing decision, i.e. given the interest
rates, it still not profitable for unaudited borrowers to pay the cost and verify
11Note that a borrower’s value only depend on the interest rate but not on the bank type,
since we assume that all banks are the same for a borrower
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their productivity to get a lower interest rate, and vice versa. Condition (3)
is the usual participation constraint for signing any contract and condition
(4) is the stability condition, which makes sure that no bank or borrower can
mutually agree to switch their partner and sign a more profitable contract.
Our equilibrium is unique in terms of the interest rates. However, since
banks earn the same expected profits over each type of contract, the differ-
ent allocations of borrowers among banks (still satisfying the size constraint)
will yield other stable matching allocations. However, under our assumption
of borrower tie break rule, our equilibrium is completely unique. A stable
matching allocation always exists given our preference assumption following
from Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).
Figure 4 gives a graphical representation for the determination of equi-
librium interest rates. Interest rates are such that they are at bank-profit
maximizing level for the least productive types, i.e for the unaudited pool of
applicants. Moreover, interest rates on the audited borrowers must be such
that those contracts yield the same expected return with the other contracts.
This is because, once banks start competing for the most productive types,
the interest rates on those contracts starts falling down, until the expected
return equals the maximum profit that can be earned with an unaudited type.
In this example, we completely abstracted from different loan sizes and kept
it simple and give the intuition.
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1.3.5 Characterization of Equilibrium
Now we present the main result of our paper:
Proposition 4. Let di be the deposit size and r
`
i be the set of loan interest
rates signed in equilibrium by bank i. For any two banks i,j s.t. di < dj:
i. µi(r
`
i ) ≥ µj(r`j)
ii. σi(r
`
i ) ≥ σj(r`j)
where µ and σ denotes the set average and standard deviation operations over
of the set r`.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 5. Take any two different loan markets. The equilibrium prof-
its made on the least valuable contract for a bank in a larger loan market is
more(weakly) valuable than the profits made of the least valuable contract in a
smaller loan market.
Proof: Follows from the stability condition of our equilibrium definition.
Proposition 6. Take any two loan markets where initial loan supplies are
equal. If there is no overlap between the markets, then we have:





One important issue is to compare our equilibrium set of contracts to
competitive equilibrium. To be able to do that, all we need is to define off-
the-equilibrium interest rates for those contracts that have not been actually
signed. We need to assign the interest rates on those contracts such that our
group stability condition is satisfied, i.e. there are no incentives for individ-
uals or groups to deviate from the equilibrium set of contracts. Then, the
set of interest rates in our equilibrium set of contracts combined with those
off the equilibrium set of interest rates altogether defines the price vector in
our economy that supports the competitive equilibrium counterpart for our
solution.
A special case of our equilibrium can be interpreted as Bertrand com-
petition. As long as the total supply for loans are not more than the demand
for loans, we could interpret our equilibrium as the banks competing for the
most productive types. From this perspective, it is easier to understand why
each contract earns the same expected profits in a stable equilibrium, similar
to Bertrand competition. In the special case where there is more loan sup-
ply then demand, then the borrowers expected utility would have been drawn
down their outside option, as then they would be bertrand competing for the
loans, not the banks.
As in Kelso and Crawford (1982), we can do comparative statics for
our equilibrium. Expectedly, adding more borrowers to one side of the market
makes all banks weakly better off and all borrowers weakly worse off. Moreover,
reverse is true for the banks. More banks imply more competition on the banks
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side, implying that borrowers will get better interest rates (weakly) and banks
are weakly worse off. Moreover, one can show that interest rates on contracts
are completely symmetric over types:
Corollary 7. Any two audited borrowers with the same characteristics sign
(if any) contracts with the same interest rate in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The corollary above simple follows from the fact that a bank that is
currently offering the lower rate would find it beneficial to offer a slightly better
rate to the borrower who is currently paying the higher rate, and would exploit
this profitable contract. The no blocking condition defined in (10) implies this
result directly.
Proposition 8. Assume that no bank has monopoly power in any of the seg-





Corollary 9. For any two borrowers with equal project size we have: z1 >
z2 ⇒ r`1 ≤ r`2.
Proof. See Appendix.
12Therefore there are at least 2 active banks operating in each of the segmented loan
markets.
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Proposition (8) suggests that the more productive a borrower, the lower
the interest rate in its loan contract. Unlike in many other models, this result
does not stem from a zero profit condition on the banks’ side. However, in a
similar fashion, the stability of our equilibrium requires the banks to earn the
exact same profits on each contract. Therefore in essence, this result follow
from the same underlying competition for the productive types. Figure (4)
summarizes this result in a nutshell. Starting any initial level of interest rates,
competition for the productive types will bring the interest rates such that
each contract earn the same expected profits.
Note that we have multiple equilibria in our model. Core is always
non-empty and contains the set of all stable sets of contracts. However, we
restrict our attention to the bank optimal stable set of contracts, which is a
unique equilibrium point.13 There are couple of reasons to focus on the bank
optimal stable outcome. First of all, unlike borrowers, banks have stronger
incentives to choose the risk level on their portfolio, therefore it matters a lot
for banks to whom they are matched in equilibrium. Moreover, for borrowers,
what matters is being able to get the loan with the best possible interest rate
independent of the identity of the bank. Secondly, except for the very large
borrowers with really good information about their project quality, mostly
banks make the ultimate offers, i.e. have the bargaining power.
13Also, note that every bank signs the same number of contracts at every point in the
core, thus our selection of the bank optimal equilibrium only affects the equilibrium interest
rates and bank profitability.
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1.3.6 Computational Algorithm
Mechanism we use to find the equilibrium in our environment is in
essence similar to that of Hatfiled and Milgrom (2005). We can’t apply their
fixed point operator simply because we have infinitely many borrowers. How-
ever, we find the equilibrium iterating on each side’s decisions similar to de-
ferred acceptance algorithm in Roth and Sotomayor (82). We start with the
autarky case where all the borrowers choose not get audited, and see what
interest rate the bank offers to a pool of applicants all of which unaudited.
Given that all the borrowers are identical in this setup, they are all equally
likely to get a loan and the probability of getting the loan is derived from
the total amount of loans supply available in each market. Given the interest
rate offered and the probability of getting a loan, next we check again if there
are any incentives to get audited starting from the most productive type in
each market14 and continue until equation (4) is satisfied. Now that we have
the best response from the borrowers, we go back to banks decision and post
the new interest rates for the updated unaudited pool, and the audited types,
which implies new probabilities for being able get a loan for each type. This
process continues until each party’ best responses do not change.
14The returns to getting audited is highest for the most productive type. However, that
is not a imposition on the algorithm, it is a conjecture for the equilibrium and it does not
rule out the other cases.
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1.4 Conclusions
This paper explores why large banks have lower but less volatile returns
on their loans compared to small banks. We bring together evidences from
empirical finance literature with a detailed matching model between banks and
borrowers to understand the channels through which this phenomenon occurs.
We see that size advantage of large banks allows them to be able to match
with more productive borrowers overall, i.e. to choose their customers from a
larger pool of applicants compared to smaller banks. Moreover, everything else
being constant, large borrowers are more advantageous in terms of verifying
their project productiveness, because of the fixed costs associated with being
audited. In equilibrium, large banks’ portfolio of loans includes more large
and verified borrowers compared to small banks’ portfolios. Therefore, they
have lower and less volatile returns on their loans.
Our results are very preliminary but promising. There are couple of
assumptions we would like to make endogenous to the model. The most im-
portant one is the loan size. Currently, we assume that project size is given
and loan size is not endogenously determined in equilibrium. Whereas in real
life, both the interest rate and the loan size are endogenously determined, and
we abstract from that. In the current model, we only stated and solved the
static loan market competition but we are currently working on the dynamic
version of the model. In our dynamic version banks make investment, entry
and exit decisions, so that bank size is an endogenous variable and the size
distribution changes overtime. Our next step is to solve for the long-run indus-
24
try equilibrium using the notion of oblivious equilibrium by Weintraub et al.
(2008). With the addition of dynamic dimension to our model, we can answer
a couple of questions: Recent trends in the US banking industry, stability of
the banking system against aggregate shocks, i.e. possibly analyze banking
crises and the future of small business finance.
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Figure 1.1: Charge-off Rate Differences by Loan Type
Figure 1.2: Return on C&I Loans by Bank Size
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Figure 1.3: Returns vs Volatility, All banks, C&I loans
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Figure 1.4: Stability in the Loan Market
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Chapter 2
Shopping time, price search and Optimal
Monetary Policy
2.1 Introduction
Welfare costs associated with inflation has been explored for many
decades, under different environments1. Researchers concluded that one way or
other, inflation distorts household’s decision for nominal assets, and therefore
is costly. Recent studies emphasized another channel of interest the previous
literature ignored calculating the welfare costs of inflation. Aguiar and Hurst
(2007) documented that doubling shopping frequency lowers a goods price
by 7 to 10 percent. They use scanner data and time diaries to document how
households substitute time for money through shopping and home production.
Moreover, McKenzie and Schargrodsky(2011) showed that during the high in-
flationary financial crisis in Argentina in 2002, people increased their shopping
frequency significantly. The devaluation resulted in a significant increase of
41% in the overall consumer price index in 2002, and along with an increase in
price dispersion in the economy. They documented that people responded to
this phenomenon by increasing their shopping activity both in intensive and
1See Lucas(2000) for a comparison of basic approaches.
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extensive margin. Mean shopping days increased from 5.02 in 2001 to 5.21 in
2002. This increase translates into almost two-thirds of households shopping
an extra day each month.
In the light of these observations, we realize that one should take into
account the fact that people do substitute time for money, when calculating
the welfare implications of inflation. In this paper, we allow people to use time
and money together to increase their consumption. When faced with a higher
inflation, returns from holding nominal assets go down, and people respond
by increasing their shopping activity instead. We show that the actual welfare
cost of inflation is lower under the existence of this additional channel.
In his very recent work, Wang (2011) uses a general equilibrium search
model with endogenous price dispersion to analyze the welfare cost of infla-
tion. Their model is built on the work by Lagos(2005), where there are search
frictions, sellers post prices and buyers decide how much of their real resources
to allocate for searching lower prices(linear and discrete). In their model, they
abstain from time substitution however. They find that search channel in-
creases the welfare cost of inflation at a very ignorable amount. Our model
however shows that the existence of the shopping activity reduces the welfare
loss associated with inflation.
Rocheteau and Wright(2005) analyzes the optimality of the Friedman
rule under three different environments with search frictions. They find that
when prices are determined competitively, or through bargaining between buy-
ers and sellers the Friedman rule is unable to correct the inefficiencies associ-
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ated with the market structure. Even if it is the optimal rule, there are welfare
costs associated with inflation. However, when market structure allows for
competitive search through price posting mechanism, then the Friedman rule
is not only optimal but also corrects the inefficiencies, creating no welfare loss.
In their early work, Cooley(1991) analyzes the interaction between the
welfare cost of inflation and the distortion due to existing fiscal tools. They
find that welfare cost of inflation almost doubles when there are are additional
taxes on capital and labor. Our paper is essentially similar to their because
we explore the reverse mechanism, where instead of distortions, if there is
an additional insurance mechanism for people to substitute time for money
through a shopping technology.
Bhattacharya et al. (2005) shows that under heterogeneity of agents
and the lack of fiscal tools to redistribute wealth among agents, the Friedman
rule is no longer optimal since inflation is the only way to redistribute the
wealth among agents. Even though we are not focusing on this channel in our
work, we still want to include wealth heterogeneity in our environment because
we want to have our model to match the fact that differences in wealth levels
are one of the main determinants of the search behavior.
The idea of substituting away from nominal balances when the inflation
is high not new obviously. Bailey(1956)describes how consumers spend real re-
sources in alternative means of exchange to avoid the inflation tax. Moreover,
Gillman (1993) calculates the welfare cost of inflation in a cash-in-advance
model where people can use cash or costly credit to purchase goods. As in-
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flation rate gets higher, substitute away from cash balances towards using
costly credit. He shows that the associated welfare cost is higher in this en-
vironment than the standard cash-in-advance type environments. Dotsey and
Ireland(1996) studies the very similar environment in a general equilibrium
framework and shows that existence of production side amplifies the welfare
cost of inflation very seriously.
Among others, Burstein and Hellwig(2008) quantitatively evaluates the
welfare effects of inflation in a menu cost model of price adjustment using a
money in the utility type model. They use a general equilibrium model and
find that the relative contribution of the price setting distortion, i.e. menu
cost, is very minimal compared to distortion created by the the opportunity
cost of real money balances. Their results encourages our assumption of partial
equilibrium since we abstain from price setting side of the story.
Our environment entails similar features to the literature above and
connects some of the links to be able to explain the patters we see in the data.
We combine the heterogeneous agents environment with a shopping technology
that allows agents to substitute time for money, at different levels. We show
that the welfare cost of inflation is lower in this environment. The remainder
of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our model
and defines the steady state equilibrium for a given level of inflation. Section
3 compares how different levels of inflation affects equilibrium decisions and
welfare levels. Section 4 concludes the paper.
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2.2 Model
In this section we introduce the model economy. Time is discrete and
infinite. Agents maximize lifetime utility in an incomplete market environ-
ment2 where they face idiosyncratic income risk. In this environment, agents
have two resources, one is real endowment and the other is time endowment.
The use of real endowment is a choice between holding inflation bearing money
and interest rate bearing bonds. Agents need to hold money in order to facili-
tate consumption. Moreover, we assume that the shopping technology is such
that people use time endowment as well as money for consumption. The key
assumption is that time and money are substitutes in our shopping technol-
ogy. We motivate this assumption by the empirical findings on price search
and shopping frequency literature.
We assume that people have 1 unit of time endowment to allocate
between shopping time and leisure 3. The population consists of a continuum





where β indicates time discount factor, ct and lt represents consumption
and leisure period t. The budget constraint in real terms is as follows:
2We also solve the same environment with representative agents where the stream of
endowments are constant over time, see the results section for the computational exercise
3We also analyze the case with labor supply, where we see endowment process as being
employed, and allocate the time accordingly
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ct +mt+1(1 + σt) +
bt+1
1 + rt
≤ yt +mt + bt +Mtσt (2.2.2)
At each period, the agent chooses money and bond holdings,mt+1 and
bt+1 for the next period and allocates his time between shopping and leisure,
st and lt. We formulate the problem in the recursive form below:
V (b,m, y) = max
m′ ,l,b,c








≤ y +m+ b+Mσ
s+ l ≤ 1
(2.2.3)






is the amount of money chosen to be used for shopping, and s is the
time spent on shopping. Moreover, note here that government redistributes the
newly printed money back to people as a lump sum transfer. So, agents start
the period by knowing how much total assets they have, i.e. b + m and they
receive their endowment shock, y ∈ {yl, yh}, which follows first order Markov
process with probability support π. The amount of consumption goods one
can buy is increasing with the amount of money held for shopping and time
4We use a very similar formulation following Ljungqvist and Sargent(2004)
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Let Γ(m, b, y) be the distribution of the population over the state space.
Then, the goods and the money market clearing conditions are:∑
i=h,l
∫ ∫









′(m, b, yi) = M
′
(2.2.6)
where : M ′ = (1 + σ)M (2.2.7)
2.3 Equilibrium
In this section we define the equilibrium. Following the literature on
dynamic stochastic equilibrium macroeconomics models, we define our steady
state equilibrium as:
Definition 10. A steady state monetary competitive equilibrium, given the
money growth rate σ, is a set of decision rules m′(m, b, y), b′(m, b, y), l(m, b, y)
and c(m, b, y), and an invariant distribution, Γ(m, b, y) over the population s.t.:
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i. Individual optimization conditions, i.e. (3) and (4) are satisfied.
ii. Markets clear, i.e. (6) are satisfied.
All three versions of our model is subject to the same equilibrium def-
inition and conditions, whereas the endogenous returns to search case market
clearing condition involves and equilibrium return parameter as we will define
in the very next section. Our results show that people shopping time to sub-
stitute leisure for consumption even in the absence of inflation. Moreover, as
documented in the data, search activity is negatively correlated with wealth
level, and the income level for the current period. We will present two different
cases first, and then compare our results for all three cases.
2.3.1 Case 2: Representative Agents Case
We know from Bhattacharya et al.(2005) that having a heterogenous
wealth distribution with inflation redistributing wealth among agents creates
a welfare effect for positive levels inflation due to concavity. Our benchmark
model environment generates a heterogenous wealth distribution in any steady
state. Therefore lower cost of inflation can also be attributed to redistribu-
tion of wealth among agents. To separate the effect of inflation through time
substitution from the redistributive channel we solve our model economy with
complete markets,i.e. as a representative agent model. In this environment
all individuals receive a constant stream of endowments and therefore make
identical decisions in any steady state. We show that even in this environ-
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ment shopping activity provides reduces the negative effects of inflation. The
individual optimization problem changes into:
V (b,m) = max
m′ ,l,b,c








≤ y +m+ b+Mσ
s+ l ≤ 1
(2.3.1)
The rest of the problem is indeed very similar to the previous case. The
market clearing conditions are identical if we drop the endowment variable y
from the distribution function Γ. Note that in any steady state, we have a
point mass of agents on the same state in this case, since everyone is identical.
Results from this case are of critical importance to us as we isolate the price
search effect in this case. The comparison of this environment with no search
environment is very indicative of the insurance channel the time substitution
contributes to people against inflation. We will present the results in section
(4). Before we go on to the results we will address another weak aspect of our
model.
2.3.2 Case 3: Endogenous Returns on Shopping Activity
Another main source of critique about our environment is that it is a
partial equilibrium model. We don’t take into account the fact that producers
do respond to shopping time spent by consumers. Actually, price posting is a
channel for producers to price discriminate between those who are willing to
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substitute time for money and those who don’t. Coupons, online deals, weekly
specials, etc. are the ways producers discriminate those “two” different types
of customers. In our environment however, we assume a functional form for the
relationship between shopping time, consumption level and the money holdings
assuming that producers do not respond to changes in aggregate shopping
behavior.In reality however, one would expect the producers re-optimize their
strategy. For example, if everyone in the society would happen to go for
coupon to get deals, start going to grocery shopping once a day to catch those
times when a certain good is on sale, then the initial purpose would have failed
for them. To address this problem, we introduce a slightly different version
of our environment in which we add an endogenous “return to search time”
variable that determines how much return is out there from spending time in
the market looking for better prices. We formulate the problem as follows5:
V (m, y;K) = max
m′ ,s,mc




(1 + σ) ≤ y +m+Mσ
s+ l ≤ 1
5Note that in this case we abstain from the bond option. The reason is that in this
formulation there is no reason to hold money anymore, unless we introduce another friction
like cash in advance. Instead we emphasize the effect of K using the very basic model
following Imrohoroglu(1992)
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where the shopping technology is defined as follows:




Here mc is the amount of money chosen to be used for shopping, and s is
the time spent on shopping. The amount of consumption goods one can buy
is increasing with the amount of money held for shopping and time spent on
shopping. Moreover, K is the return on shopping activity and is determined
in equilibrium through the goods market clearing condition. Note that,given
the amount of money hold constant in the economy, if everybody increases
their search activity, the parameter K has to adjust(go down) such that the
goods market clears. In other words, what really matters is relative search. If
an agent is spending more shopping time than everybody else in the economy,
then there are gains. On the other hand, however, this mechanism puts a
burden on the wealthiest people in the economy as they will either be forced
to spend more time or more money for the same amount of goods just because
all the other people are spending a lot of time shopping and looking for better
prices.









Γ(m, y)m′(m, y) = M ′












In this section we present our results for various computational experi-
ments. We calibrate our model economy to US economy and computed steady
state equilibrium for different levels of inflation. We assume the following












(1 +m′(1 + τ))θ
(2.4.1)
Table 1 shows the parameter values we used for calibration. We took
most of the values from the literature
In Table 2 we present the results of our model at different inflation
levels. This values are calculated comparing the steady state utility levels,
and how much does inflation affect the utility level from compared to 0%
inflation rate. For example, a 5% increase in yearly inflation reduces the
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Table 2.1: Parameter Calibration
Parameter Value Definition
β .98 discount factor
σ 1.5 CRRA param. for c
θ 2 convexity for shopping tech.
πh 0.97 P (yt+1 = yh|yt = yh)
πl 0.5 P (yt+1 = yl|yt = yl)
α 1.5 CRRA param. for l
yh 1 high endowment
yl .2 low endowment
welfare level by 10% in the benchmark environment with no time substitution
option. One pattern we see looking at our results is that, expectedly, having
both heterogeneity and time substitution together makes the effect of inflation
very mild on the welfare.
On the other hand, having endogenous returns on the time spent on
shopping reduces the effectiveness of the time substitution as everyone in the
economy attempts to use shopping time and the return on it goes down sig-
nificantly. As we can see, 5% yearly inflation still causes an 8% decline in the
welfare level in this case, still lower than the no search case.
Table 2.2: Inflation and Welfare
Yearly Inflation No search Heterogenous Representative Endogenous
5% -%10 -%2 -%4 -%8
10% -%14 -%3.5 -%6 -%11
20% -%36 -%12 -%18 -%22
For comparison reasons, we would like to present our welfare compar-
ison in terms of the consumption levels. In other words, in the table we will
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present that the amount of real consumption good that is necessary to com-
pensate the consumer for the increase in inflation such that the initial level of
steady state utility is reached in each case.
Table 2.3: Welfare in Consumption Terms
Yearly Inflation No search Heterogenous Representative Endogenous
5% %3.7 %1.1 %2.4 %2.8
10% %4.4 %1.9 %3.1 %3.8
20% %8.8 %4.2 %5.4 %6.4
We find that higher levels of inflation induces higher levels of search
activity in the economy, consistent with the data presented in McKenzie and
Schargrodsky(2011). Moreover, we find that people at lower wealth levels
increase their search activity more than people with higher wealth levels, in
all of our model specifications. Therefore we can see both channels through
which price search interact with inflation. It provides people an insurance
mechanism against high inflation, and does it more intensely for poorer people.
We also see that having an endogenous return on the shopping time activity
does reduce the effectiveness of the mechanism. In this case what matters the
most is “relative” search.
2.5 Conclusion
In this study, we focus on the fact that existence of a shopping tech-
nology reduces the welfare cost of inflation. Opportunity of substituting time
for money gives agents a channel to hedge themselves against inflation. In-
flation reduces the return on money, and therefore people can either choose
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to give away from their bond holdings to be able to maintain a given level of
consumption, or substitute time for money. Having this option reduces the
welfare cost of inflation, in all specification of the model.
Evidently, people do substitute time for money according to empirical
evidence. The policymaker should be taking into account the fact that peo-
ple respond to changes in inflation by adjusting their shopping frequency as
well. In this paper, we illustrate this channel with a very simple example.
However, our environment assumes a given shopping technology and therefore
only looking at the partial equilibrium. We should consider the effects of infla-
tion on producers price setting decisions, and how changes in inflation affect
the price dispersion, and therefore returns to shopping activity. Moreover, a
second strong assumption of our model is the independence of our returns to
shopping activity from the rest of the economy. In real life, one would expect
that if everyone else is increasing the shopping frequency, that will generate a
most probably decreasing effect on the returns to shopping activity.
A great extension and a direct application of our model should be to
calibrate our environment for the Argentinean economy and try to match the
exact changes in shopping time activity across different wealth levels. For
that matter, one would need to use to calculate the transition dynamics and
focus on the very short term effects of the sudden “unanticipated” increase
in inflation, as in it happened during the 2002 crisis in Argentine. Obviously,
our case is confined to a comparison of steady states with different levels
of anticipated inflation. Therefore one should see our results more from a
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qualitative standpoint than an exact quantitative match of the real world.
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Chapter 3
Direct vs. Indirect Measures of Inflation
Expectations: A Case Study in 4 Countries
3.1 Introduction
The ultimate goal of any central bank policy is to achieve and maintain
price stability. As an unobserved component, inflation expectations are very
crucial for determining future inflation, mainly through price and wage setting
behaviors. Therefore those expectations need to be measured with sufficient
precision. In this study we derive bounds for inflation expectations for 4
countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Chile using the
relationship between interest rates and inflation expectations, and compare
these bounds to the results of survey data in those countries. Particularly,
we recalculate inflation bounds in Ireland (1996) and compare these bounds
with a direct measure of inflation expectations, the median responses of the
Livingston survey. We apply the same procedure to all countries in our sample
in an attempt to seek a plausible comparison1.
Our results show that, for the US and UK data, the inflation bounds
1As we will show later in the paper, restricting our attention to a developed country,
US, might lead to adverse conclusions and we believe Turkish economy is a good case for
developing countries.
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suggested by Ireland (1996) are more volatile than survey results, and too
narrow to contain them, due to low standard errors in consumption growth
series stemming from high persistence. This result seems to be discouraging
for the usefulness of bounds, but the Turkish and Chilean cases offer better
results in favor of this approach. Calculated real interest rates are very volatile
in Turkey and therefore movements in the nominal interest rates themselves
cannot be used as an indicator of changes in inflation expectations. Result are
somewhat better in Chilean case as well. Taking risk premia into account can
address the problem in the UK and US cases.
Literature on the relationship between future inflation and interest rates
starts with Fisher’s (1907) early work with a postulate that nominal interest
rates, in a perfect foresight world, are equal to the real rate of return plus the
future rate of inflation. Two views have been raised about the relationship
between the real rate and inflation expectations2. The first view, following
Mundell (1963) and Tobin (1965) claims that the expected real return com-
ponent of nominal interest rates is negatively related to the expected inflation
component. The intuition behind this view is that in an environment with high
inflation, agents economize on their nominal asset holdings and hold more real
balances which result in a lower marginal product of capital. The second view
is contrary to the first one. This view started with Fama (1975), and advocates
the constancy of the real rate through time, and hence that nominal interest
rates can be used as a signal of future inflation expectations.
2For a very detailed literature survey, see section 3 of Stock and Watson (2003).
46
Discussion of the relation of inflation expectations to the ex-ante real
rate has extended further after the uncertainty was introduced into the Fisher
equation by Lucas (1978). He suggested that, in a world with uncertainty,
nominal interest rates consist of a risk premium along with the real rate of re-
turn and an inflation premium. None of these three components are observable,
but Ireland (1996) managed to characterize bounds on inflation expectations
using the risk premium. Using ten-year US Treasury bond yields, he showed
that real interest rates are quite stable. Therefore, natural limits on risk pre-
mia 3 allowed him to draw the bounds on inflation expectations, which are
pretty close to each other for US data due to a low risk premium.
Research on inflation expectations in Turkey is relatively new. In one
of the earlier works, Sahinbeyoglu and Yalcin (2000) analyzed inflation expec-
tations in Turkey by applying regressions with several explanatory variables,
following Mishkin (1981). They found that the term structure of nominal in-
terest rates has valuable information about inflation expectations. Berument
and Malatyali (2001) employed GARCH models to identify anticipated and
unanticipated inflation. Their findings support the existence of the Mundell-
Tobin effect for the case of Turkey, suggesting that the chronically high level
of inflation leads to low real rates and stimulates the Turkish economy 4. Our
study departs from theirs as well as from other relevant studies using Turk-
ish data in a couple of ways. First, we use a forward-looking model for the
3As will be explained later, there are natural limits on risk premia.
4In a more recent paper, Gul and Acikalin (2008) rejected Fisher’s hypothesis for Turkish
data without using risk premia in the regression equation.
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inflation expectations while they assume purely adaptive expectations behav-
ior. Expectations should not be modeled by pure time-series models, because
individuals have a larger set of information than just the inflation series, and
they use this set fully in their decision-making processes. Therefore, similar to
Ireland (1996), we use individual consumption decisions to derive information
about inflation expectations. Second, our approach doesn’t identify inflation
components; rather, it presents inflation bounds incorporated with the infla-
tion risk premium. Our main contribution to this literature is comparing the
Turkish survey data with these bounds and testing the usefulness of these
survey results.
3.2 The Model
In this section, we introduce a version of the theoretical model originally
proposed by Lucas (1978). Our model economy is populated by a continuum
of infinitely lived households. The representative agent receives a stream of
income, yt. Each period, he chooses how much to consume ct and how much
to invest on two assets: one real asset bt that costs one unit of consumption
good at time t and returns rt consumption good at time t+1, and one nominal
asset Bt
5 costs Pt at time t and returns Rt at time t + 1 that can be traded
with consumption good at the price Pt+1.
There is uncertainty about future variables that will help us form the
5All nominal variables are represented in capital letters throughout the paper.
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bounds on inflation expectations following Ireland (1996). The uncertainty is
about future prices, income, consumption, interest rates, and bond holdings.
That is, our representative agent may not learn the exact values of Pt, yt, ct,
Rt, rt, Bt, and bt until the beginning of period t; before then, he regards these








subject to the following budget constraint:
ct + bt +Bt/Pt ≤ yt + rt−1bt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1/Pt (3.2.2)
Solution to this optimization problem yields the following two condi-
tions:
1/rt = βEt[(1/xt+1)] (3.2.3)
1/Rt = βEt[(1/xt+1)(1/πt+1)] (3.2.4)
where xt+1 = ct+1/ct and πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt are the rate of consumption and in-
flation, respectively. The first equation is relating the expected consumption
ratio to ex-ante real interest rate. The second equation presents this relation
in terms of nominal variables, i.e. nominal interest rates and expected infla-
tion rate. Even though the ex-ante real interest rates are unobservable, this
equation lets us use consumption data as a way to obtain an estimate for them.
One can rewrite equation (3.2.4) as:
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1/Rt = βCovt[(1/xt+1), (1/πt+1)] + βEt[1/xt+1]Et[1/πt+1] (3.2.5)
combining with equation (3.2.3), we get:
1/Rt = βCovt[(1/xt+1), (1/πt+1)] + (1/rt)Et[1/πt+1] (3.2.6)
Equation (3.2.6) is a generalized version of the well-known Fisher equa-
tion, which relates real interest rates to inflation and nominal interest rates.
Sign of the covariance term here determines how the nominal interest rates
are affected by the relation between inverse consumption growth and inflation
rate. We follow by replacing the risk premium term as:
βCovt[(1/xt+1), (1/πt+1)] = βρtStdt[1/xt+1]Stdt[1/πt+1] (3.2.7)
where ρt is the correlation coefficient defined by:
ρt = Covt[(1/xt+1), (1/πt+1)]/{Stdt[1/xt+1]Stdt[1/πt+1]} (3.2.8)
Using the fact that the correlation coefficient has to be between −1 and
1, we derive the following inequality:
Stdt[1/xt+1]Stdt[1/πt+1] ≥ Covt[(1/xt+1), (1/πt+1)] ≥ −Stdt[1/xt+1]Stdt[1/πt+1]
(3.2.9)
This inequality puts bounds on the covariance term we are interested
in. Following Ireland (1996), we impose the additional assumption on the size
of the coefficient of variation for 1/πt+1 :
Stdt[1/πt+1]/Et[1/πt+1] ≤ 1 (3.2.10)
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As Ireland (1996) has done it for US case, we justified this assumption
by looking at the Turkish data as well and found that the coefficient of variation
never exceeded 0.05 for 1998-2008 period. Hence, similar to Ireland (1996),
our bounds are extremely conservative.
In the light of equation (3.2.10), rearranging equation (3.2.9) using
(3.2.5) gives us:
βRt{Et[1/xt+1] + Stdt[1/xt+1]} ≥ 1/E[1/πt+1]
≥ βRt{Et[1/xt+1]− Stdt[1/xt+1]}
(3.2.11)
This is almost exactly what one needs to derive the bounds on expected
inflation. If we use the approximation:
1/Et[1/πt+1] ≈ Et[πt+1] (3.2.12)
then we have the bounds ready to be estimated. The width of the bounds will
be dependent on the size of the risk premium, which in term will be estimated
using the consumption ratio using aggregate consumption data.
3.3 Estimation Methodology for the Real Interest Rate
and Bounds on Expected Inflation
We use the same estimation technique proposed by Ireland (1996). The
relationship between observed variables, nominal interest rate and consump-
tion, and unobserved variables, real interest rate and bounds on expected infla-
tion, are proposed by equations (3.2.3) and (3.2.11). The only two unknowns
in these equations are Et[1/xt+1] and Stdt[1/xt+1], namely expectation and
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standard deviation of next period’s inverse growth rate of aggregate consump-
tion, and can be estimated through a time series model fit to 1/xt+1. Now, for
convenience, let gt+1 = 1/xt+1 and assume that gt+1 follows an AR(1) process
such that
gt+1 = γ + ρgt + εt+1 (3.3.1)
where γ is a constant and ρ is the AR(1) parameter. εt+1 is the random error
term and satisfies
Et[εt+1] = 0, Stdt[εt+1] = σ,Et[εt+1εt−j] = 0, Et[εt+1gt−j] = 0 ∀j (3.3.2)
where σ is constant through time. Next, we define the data we use for US.
3.3.1 Inverse Consumption Ratio Estimation Results
The table below shows the results from our estimation for the inverse
consumption ratio. For E{ 1
xt+1
} we use the smaple average of the predicted
value, which is different at any quarter. For the actual bounds we use the
predicted value for the coming quarter, using only the information available
up to that quarter. It seems like the standard deviation of inverse consumption
Table 3.1: Inverse Consumption Rates
US UK Turkey Chili
E{ 1
xt+1
} 0.98 1.002 0.98 1.005
std{ 1
xt+1
} 0.013 0.01 0.06 0.017
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ratio differs significantly across countries, which is partly accountable for our
results. Relatively higher standard deviation of this ratio drives the bounds
to be wider than the lower standard deviation countries.
3.4 US Data
Our model period is one quarter, similar to Ireland (1996), but we use
annual bond yields instead of ten-year returns, i.e. 4-period-ahead expecta-
tions are used. Since the model period is finer than the interval of bond yields,
estimation using ordinary least squares give consistent estimates of AR param-
eters but biased σ estimates (see Hansen and Hodrick (1980) 6). Consistent
estimates of σ are derived using the method proposed in Hansen and Hodrick
(1980), modified as suggested by Newey and West (1987).
We analyzed 1959:1 to 2009:1 period for US data. The nominal inter-
est rate is measured by the market yield on U.S. Treasury bonds at 1-year
constant maturity achieved from the Federal Reserve database. Per capita
consumption values are found by dividing the seasonally adjusted series of
real personal aggregate nondurables and services expenditures 7 by the size of
the noninstitutional civilian population, ages 16 and over 8.
6Hansen and Hodrick (1980) further show that k -step-ahead OLS estimator is dominant
to the OLS estimator proposed by the resampling at every kth integer in the sense that
(1) the latter exceeds in error variance over the former by a positive definite matrix, and
(2) using the former has a higher power in testing the null hypothesis. Therefore, the
estimation strategy used in our paper is superior to the natural alternative of adjusting the
model period to one year.
7Consumption Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
8Population Data Source: Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey.
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3.5 Results for US Data
Results for US data is depicted in Figure 3.1. Bounds for inflation
expectations are far wider in our model based on one-year returns compared
to ten-year returns of Ireland’s, bound width is between 1.32% and 1.52% in
our model while it is 0.15% to 0.17% in Ireland’s. However, they are still too
narrow to contain survey results. Particularly, bounds do not contain survey
results 53% of the time. The Livingston survey results offer a much smoother
path for the inflation expectations than the expectations derived from our
model. The main reason behind this result is the excess volatility in nomi-
nal interest rates compared to inverse growth in consumption. With a lower
variability in the real rate suggested by the observed stable path of inverse
consumption growth, inflation expectations capture most of the variability in
nominal rates.
3.6 UK Data
For the UK case, we use the NOP Inflation Attitudes Survey that is
conducted by the Bank of England from 2001 onwards. The question 2A in the
survey asks people the following question: “How much would you expect prices
in the shops generally to change over the next 12 months?” We use the median
response to this question to form our series for the inflation expectations.
For consumption, we use the seasonally adjusted household final con-
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sumption expenditure data9 provided by the Office for National Statistics.
Also the nominal interest rates, we use the quarterly average yield from British
Government Securities, Nominal Par Yield10 provided by the Bank of England.
3.7 Results for UK data
Figure 3.2 compares the bounds on inflation expectations derived from
the model to the survey results. The bounds are unable to contain the survey
results for most of the time period, similar to the US case. The only times the
survey results are indeed inside the bounded area is when the inflation rate is
actually high. As it is in the US case, the survey results are a lot more stable
over the time period compared to the bounds.
3.8 Turkish Data
This section analyzes 2000-2009 period for Turkish data. There are rea-
sons for this choice. First, Turkey experienced a disinflation and stabilization
process starting from 2000 and a more stable state has been reached by the
end of 2003. These two different environments offer a good analysis diversity.
Second, and more importantly, data availability on surveys limits our set of
possible dates. Only one of the surveys was available before 2001 while the
other two surveys we analyzed have starting dates of 2001 and 2003.
Data is gathered as follows. The nominal interest rates are yearly com-
9Series ABJR is used in our analysis.
10Series IUQASNPY is used.
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pounded interest rates of treasury discounted auctions 11, available monthly
for our sample period. There have been three months where the Turkish Trea-
sury did not auction bills but since no two or more such instances occurred
in a certain quarter, we just ignored those dates when we get quarterly aver-
ages. Consumption data is obtained by dividing seasonally adjusted private
final consumption expenditure figures 12 by the estimated quarterly popula-
tion, ages between 15 and 64. Mid-year population estimates and population
growth rates are combined with age dependency ratio 13 and interpolated to
achieve quarterly population figures.
3.8.1 Consumer Tendency Survey
Starting from 2003, TURKSTAT and CBRT have jointly conducted the
Consumer Tendency Survey (CTS), which aims at measuring consumer ten-
dencies and expectations. The scope of the survey includes all individuals who
are 15 and above and have a job that provide income, in urban or rural areas
of Turkey. Survey frequency is one month and the participant size changes
between 7100 and 8700 for the 2003-2009 period. Inflation expectations are
asked as the direction of changes in prices over the next 12 months and hence
point estimates of inflation expectations are unavailable and need to be de-
rived. A recent study by Oral (2009) that quantifies answers about inflation
11Nominal Interest Rates Source: Turkish Undersecretariat of Treasury.
12Consumption Data Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts Dataset, LNBQRSA
measure.
13Population Data Source: TURKSTAT.
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expectations of this survey is used for this purpose.
3.9 Results for Turkish Data
We first derive ex-ante real interest rates from our model and compare
them with the ex-post real rates calculated using nominal returns and actual
inflation. Figure 3.3 depicts both series 14. It can be seen as a data fact that
ex-post real rates are highly volatile. Even though the induced ex-ante real
rates are less volatile than the ex-post rates, they vary within a range of -6.9%
to 17.6%, which makes it impossible to infer inflation expectations movements
directly from a change in nominal interest rates. Therefore, deriving bounds
for Turkish inflation expectations is more important and essential compared
to US case.
The bounds for inflation expectations are derived for Turkish data and
compared with the survey mentioned above. Actual inflation series is also
drawn for comparison purposes. Because of the late availability of the survey,
we can make a comparison only for the stable inflation path starting from
late 2003. Our results show that the CTS responses are contained within the
bounds for the whole sample period.




Central Bank Of Chile conveys monthly survey of selected academics,
consultants, and executives or advisors of financial institutions and corpora-
tions. As a part of the Central Bank of Chile Economic Expectations Survey,
subjects are asked for their expected inflation for the following 12 month pe-
riod. Again we use the median responses. This survey is available since 2001.
Seasonally adjusted consumption expenditure and nominal average deposit
rate at annual percentage are taken from the Central Bank of Chile as well.
3.11 Results for Chilean data
Below is Figure 3.5 that show the bounds on inflation expectations
derived from the model and the survey results. The survey results fall within
the bounds for most of the time period. As the nominal interest rates are a
multiplier for the size of the upper and lower bounds, the higher it is at any
time the higher the difference, i.e. the width, of the bounds. That’s why in
the Chilean case, bounds are a lot wider than the US and UK cases.
3.12 Conclusion
There are direct and indirect measures available to central banks and
many different techniques have been proposed in the literature. In this study,
we tested the bounds of inflation expectations obtained from Ireland (1996),
an indirect measure, using multiple survey results, a direct measure, in 4
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countries, US, UK, Chile and Turkey. Our results indicate that, those bounds
do a better job containing the survey results in Turkey and Chile compared
to US and UK. There are two reasons behind this result. First of all, the
sensitivity of the Ireland’s methodology to the movements in consumption
growth rates. As the estimate for the ex-ante interest rates are calculated
using the consumption growth rates in our model, and Turkish consumption
data is a lot more volatile than the rest of the countries, inflation expectations
bounds for Turkey are a lot wider than the other cases. Also, the nominal
interest rate is the coefficient on the in front of the bounds and the higher it
is the wider the bounds are.
A secondary result obtained from our analysis is that, unlike in US,
real interest rates are extremely volatile in Turkey and movements in nominal
interest rates can not be used to predict the changes in inflation expectations.
Due to a stable real interest rate and low risk premia in US, Ireland (1996)
suggests that movements in the nominal interest rates primarily reflect changes
in inflationary expectations. However, Turkish case offers unstable real rates
and high risk premia, and therefore computing a good measure of inflation
expectations is more essential.
A comprehensive theoretical model that captures a country specific de-
fault risk premium component might help explain the difference in volatilities
in consumption series. Obviously, in the current formulation we don’t account
for that. So the bounds for the US and UK case would have been a lot less
volatile if our model had accounted for this factor. This would be interesting
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Proof of Proposition 4. Let d1 < d2 be two banks. Equation (2) defines the
banks’ portfolio problem and we can see that two banks have the same identical
problem except for the capacity constraint. We also know that borrowers have
indifferent among different bank sizes. Together, it means that the larger
bank, d2, has the same optimization problem with a more relaxed capacity
constraint. So at any optimum portfolio, large banks optimal portfolio has to
be at least as good as the smaller banks portfolio. Hence, the larger bank’s
portfolio contains proportionately more of the productive borrowers. And we
know that more productive borrowers get charged lower interest rate on their













Proof of Proposition 6. Take two markets i = 1, 2 s.t. `1 < `2. We want to
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show that z∗`1 > z
∗
`2
. Assume for a contradiction that z∗`1 ≤ z
∗
`2
. We will define:
EUAi = Γ(zi, `i, µ, σ)p(R
∗(r`i(zi, µ, σ)), zi)[R
∗(r`i(zi, µ, σ))− r`i(zi, µ, σ)]
EUUi = Γ(`i, µ, σ)p(R
∗(r`i(µ, σ)), zi)[R
∗(r`i(µ, σ))− r`i(µ, σ)]
for i = 1, 2
(1.1.2)
Since we assumed that the cost function has a fixed and a proportional com-







using equation (4) implies:
EUA1 (z
∗
1)− EUU1 (z∗1) > EUA2 (z∗2)− EUU2 (z∗2) (1.1.4)
Next, since we assumed that z∗`1 ≤ z
∗
`2
, it means that in the larger loan
market, the borrowers with z∗`1 in the second market did not find it profitable
to get audited. That implies:
EUA2 (z
∗
2)− EUU2 (z∗2) > EUA2 (z∗1)− EUU2 (z∗1) (1.1.5)
i.e. the expected benefit from getting audited is smaller than the cost of getting
audited. Equations A.3 and A.4 together implies:
EUA1 (z
∗
1)− EUU1 (z∗1) > EUA2 (z∗1)− EUU2 (z∗1) (1.1.6)
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Since we assumed that z∗`1 ≤ z
∗
`2
, the pool of applicants that are non-
audited in the larger loan market are of a higher quality, i.e. there are more
productive types in the unaudited pool of applicant in the large loan market.
In that case, the interest rate that the better pool gets charged is lower, i.e.
so ru2 ≤ ru1 . This implies that: EUU1 (z∗1) > EUU2 (z∗1). Moreover, since ex-







1). So we have a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 8. Note that this proposition does not restrict the bor-
rowers to have the same loan size. That’s exactly why we rule out the monopoly
case from all segmented loan markets to prove our result. Take any two au-
dited borrowers, a bank’s profits over loan contracts per unit of loan is strictly
increasing in borrowers productivity, z. Equilibrium requires the contracts to
earn the same expected profit per unit of loan, therefore a bank can always
improve profits by offering a slightly lower interest rate to a more productive
borrower unless the interest rates are such that offering a lower interest rate
to a more productive borrower is not profitable anymore. Since the profits per
unit is increasing in the loan interest rate (up to the peak point beyond which
is never an equilibrium), a more productive borrower will get a lower interest
rate in order for the per unit profits to be the same for the banks.
Proof of Corollary 9. Assume that X
′
is the equilibrium set of contracts. As-
sume for a contradiction that two borrowers j1 = j2,with the same pro-




x1 = (i1, j1, r1), x2 = (i2, j2, r2) and r1 6= r2. WLOG, assume that r1 > r2.
If there is only one bank that is large enough to offer a contract to these two
borrowers,i.e.i1 = i2, then it would mean that this bank has monopoly power
over these borrowers, and since we know that the profit curve is single peaked
in the loan interest rate, then we know that at least one of the contracts is not
profit maximizing, i.e. does not satisfy banks’ problem (2).
Lets assume that i1 6= i2. Now lets construct the following contract
x3 = (i2, j1,
r1+r2
2
). If this contract is already in X
′
, then it means that bank 2
is not optimizing as we stated above. If it is indeed not part if the equilibrium
set of contracts, then it violates the no blocking condition, i.e. equation (10).
Because this new contract that we constructed is gives better utility to bank
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